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THE PALESTINIANS IN EGYPT: IDENTITY, BASIC
RIGHTS AND HOST STATE POLICIES
Oroub El-Abed
Egyptian policy towards the estimated 50,000–70,000 Palestinians residing on its
territory has resulted in depriving them of basic rights. Practice belies the apparent
commitment to help them preserve their Palestinian identity. Consistent denial of
rights has eroded, not bolstered, Palestinian identity. Palestinians remain excluded
from the international assistance regime in place elsewhere in the region. The wel-
come that Nasser gave to dispossessed Arab brethren has turned into suspicion of
unwelcome foreigners. State policies, security surveillance, and intimidation by the
media have forced Palestinians to hide or suppress their identity. The Palestinian
community is seen as a threat to Egypt’s stability despite the fact that they constitute a
mere 0.1 per cent of the population. Thousands of vulnerable young Palestinians are
“ illegal” despite having been born in Egypt. Unable to leave with any confidence of
being allowed to return, they live in constant fear of discovery. As the third or fourth
post-nakba generation, they have minimal knowledge of Palestine or connection to
traditional kin networks. State policies have left them in limbo, denying them both
rights and identity.
1. Introduction
There is often a conflation between citizenship and/or settling Palestinians
(tawtin), and the provision of basic rights and protection when addressing the
issue of Palestinians living in Arab host countries. It is frequently argued that
improving Palestinian conditions and giving them basic rights would facilitate
their full integration in the host society and thus weaken their Palestinian iden-
tity, leading them to forget Palestine. In other words, the politics of the host
countries risk depriving Palestinians of their rights in order to preserve their
Palestinian identity.
This fallacy of a supposed link between the provision of basic rights and the
loss or weakening of Palestinian identity, is perfectly illustrated by the situation
of Palestinians living in Egypt. Observations from fieldwork conducted for
almost six months, in Cairo and other northern governorates in Egypt during
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2001–3, demonstrated that the major factors encouraging Palestinians to hide or
even lose their sense of Palestinian identity, are the deprivation of basic rights and
the uncertainties arising from their precarious legal status.1 State policies have
spawned a culture of fear in which Palestinians often tend to hide their identity.
Thus, the purported objective of the host state – the preservation of identity –
has been subverted, not attained.
Changes to the Egyptian Nationality Law enacted in 2004, suggest that
there is a lack of logic behind ongoing moves aiming at withholding basic rights
from Palestinians in Egypt. The revision to the law guarantees automatic
Egyptian citizenship to all children born to Egyptian mothers (including those
married to Palestinians). It gives citizenship rights to children born to mixed
Palestinian–Egyptian couples after the law’s passage. Those born before 2004
continue to be holders of Egyptian travel documents and live in limbo in Egypt,
often prevented from accessing rights and basic services. This state of affairs
promises to develop into a major divide as years go by, cutting across families,
with younger siblings having Egyptian citizenship and the privileges that go with
it and older ones consigned to being “Palestinians”, and as such only holding
temporary Egyptian travel documents that give them practically no rights to
education, work, residency, or even re-entry to Egypt if they go abroad.
Egypt has always played a role in the forging of Palestinian representative
structures, from the Government of All Palestine2 to the formation of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO/Fatah). As the first Arab State to
sign a peace agreement with Israel (at Camp David in 1978), Egypt has con-
sistently mediated between the conflicting parties, be it the Israelis and the
Palestinians or the Palestinians themselves, as it has done during recent conflicts
between Fatah and Hamas. The paradox between the very supportive role Egypt
has played on the Arab and international stage and the restrictive and injudicious
policies it has simultaneously pursued towards Palestinians living on its territory,
raises many questions. Why is Egypt unable to accommodate the Palestinians
when they represent such a miniscule proportion of the Egyptian population?
Why has Egypt seemed impelled to ever more tightly constrain such a very small
group with limited rights, restricting their activities and seriously limiting their
mobility to and from Egypt?
1 This article reflects findings of the research project, “The livelihoods of Palestinian refugees in Egypt”, funded
by the International Development Research Centre in Ottawa, Canada and hosted by the Forced Migration
and Refugee Studies Program at the American University in Cairo in 2001–3. The author, the principal
researcher, had five field assistants who worked with her in the field to conduct the interviews in the six
governorates in central and northeastern Egypt. The findings of the field work, with thorough analysis, were
recently published (O. El-Abed, Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt Since 1948, Beirut, Institute for Palestinian
Studies/IDRC, 2009).
2 The Cairo-based shadow government established under the auspices of the Arab League in Gaza on 22 Sept.
1948 and sponsored by Egypt. GAP was led by Hajj Amin Husseini, during the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. Its
sovereign territory was Gaza, as the West Bank had been annexed to Jordan. Its sole function was to issue
travel documents to Palestinians in Egypt and Gaza from 1949 to 1960 when Egypt replaced them with
Egyptian travel documents.
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The first part of this article examines the international, regional, and local
mechanisms designed to address the Palestinian refugee issue. For political rea-
sons, they have failed to ensure Palestinians their right of return, protect them, or
compensate them for their losses. In Egypt, Palestinians continue to be denied
the benefits of the assistance and protection provided for in international law. In
a fluctuating political environment, Egyptian policies towards Palestinian repre-
sentation (the PLO) are in flux and it is Palestinians living in Egypt who often
pay the price.
The second part will analyse the policies designed to treat Palestinians in
Egypt as Arab brethren (1954–78), an era when Egypt was accommodating the
Palestinians and was supportive of their political representation. After the 1978
assassination of the Egyptian Minister of Culture, Yusif al-Siba‘i, a new era
started during which Palestinians were and are assigned the category of for-
eigners. It will trace the emergence of a culture of fear among the Palestinian
community in Egypt, the rights which are available to them and how the dep-
rivation of rights has forced many to assimilate in order to survive. Today
Palestinians are scattered across the centre, north, and the northwest of Egypt,
dwindling in numbers, often invisible due to their legal limbo. The Egyptian
State pledged to safeguard the Palestinian identity, but in practice has managed
to diffuse it and to stigmatize the Palestinian community.
2. Limits of aid and protection mechanisms
After a fact-finding mission to the area in September 1948, the United Nations
Mediator in Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte, presented a report to the UN
General Assembly on the situation in Palestine and the situation of Palestinian
refugees. He emphasized that the “right of the refugees to return to their homes”
must be maintained and their return take place “at the earliest practical date.”3
A Zionist terrorist assassinated Bernadotte soon after he submitted his report,
but the UN took into account his recommendations and incorporated them in
the well-known UN General Assembly resolution 1944 that recognized the right
of the refugees to return to their homes and to be compensated for losses or
damages. It also instructed that Palestinian refugees be economically and socially
rehabilitated, and that these tasks be coordinated by the United Nations.
The resolution established the United Nations Conciliation Commission for
Palestine (UNCCP) and gave it the broad mandate to achieve a final settlement
of the outstanding issues between the parties, and the specific mandate to protect
the Palestinian refugees, inter alia by facilitating their repatriation and ensuring
payment of compensation.
The UNCCP was able to negotiate the return of a very limited number of
refugees, no more than a few hundred, who were on the borders of Lebanon
3 Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator of Palestine, Part I, Section V.3 UN General Assembly
Official Records: Third Session, Supplement no. 11 (A/648), 16 Sept. 1948.
4 UNGA res. 194 (III) para.11, 11 Dec. 1948.
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and Jordan. In 1950, it established a Refugee Office to determine the ownership,
interest, and nature of each refugee property, and prepared an initial plan for the
individual assessment of refugee properties relying on detailed information
collected from refugees. Although the UNCCP failed to activate its protection
mandate for Palestinians, it currently maintains the most comprehensive records
in existence of Palestinian refugee properties. In 1952, the UNCCP reached the
conclusion that it was unable to fulfil its mandate due to the lack of international
political will to ensure the return of Palestinian refugees. The commission was
not provided with the machinery or resources to carry out its mandate.
Palestinians in Egypt remain unprotected under international law and Arab
League protocols, and are denied the protection offered to refugees elsewhere in
the world. Palestinians in Egypt were excluded from the work of the UNCCP
and subsequently excluded from the ongoing assistance and relief services
provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which does not operate in Egypt. To
make matters worse, Palestinians in Egypt were also excluded from the mandate
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
Interpretations of UNCCP as a symbol of the unresolved Arab–Israeli con-
flict have varied. Terry Rempel from the Bethlehem-based Resource Center for
Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights (BADIL) considered the dual mandate
(the broad one to achieve settlement and the specific one to protect refugees by
ensuring return and compensation) as a fatal impediment to UNCCP achieving
its objectives.5 The resolution in its Article III represented the right of return
that was emphasized by Bernadotte’s report. Yet the political realities and the
non-supportive recommendations of committees and subcommittees did not
help to move the discussion further.6 Some UNCCP representatives from the
United States, France, and Turkey (both close allies to the United States) were
keen not to cross what Fischbach has called the “red lines.” As repatriation was
regarded as not feasible, the committee instead called for compensation for
refugees.7
The UNCCP failed to achieve its protection mission and the 1951 Refugee
Convention has also failed to protect Palestinians in Egypt who do not receive
any assistance or protection from any UN body. Article 1D of the 1951 Refugee
Convention relating to Palestinian refugees makes it clear that a case like that of
Palestinians in Egypt applies perfectly well:
This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving
from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.
5 T. Rempel, United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Information and Discussion Brief No 5,
Bethlehem, West Bank, Badil, 2000, 3.
6 See, for instance, the recommendations against return made by the UN Economic Survey Mission for the
Middle East, established in 1949.
7 M. Fischbach, “The United Nations and Palestinian refugee property compensation”, Journal of Palestine
Studies 31(2), 2002, 36.
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When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the
position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with the
relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this
Convention.8
According to the 1951 Convention’s drafting history, however, as detailed in
Les Travaux Pre´paratoires, “the shared intention of the Arab and Western states
was to deny Palestinians access to the Convention-based regime so long as the
United Nations continues to assist them in their own region.”9 The Arab States
led by Egypt are on record as favouring the Palestinian refugee exclusion clause
of the 1951 Convention and of the UNHCR statute. Takkenberg states that the
main reason that emerged from an examination of the Travaux Pre´paratoires was
their concern that if the Palestinians were included under the scope of the 1951
Convention, they “would become submerged [within other categories of refu-
gees] and would be relegated to a position of minor importance”, which could
have a negative impact on the refugees’ chances of repatriation. The Arab States,
according to Akram, argued that the Palestinian refugee problem was to be
resolved in accordance with UN General Assembly resolution 194(III); that is,
on the basis of a special formula of repatriation and compensation, rather than
the formula commonly accepted for refugees at the time, resettlement in a third
country.10 Arab Nations believed that funding relief efforts was the responsibility
of the Western States that had supported partition and the creation of Israel.
The Arab States, “were concerned that assistance or protection be extended to
the Palestinian refugees irrespective of whether [UN] relief would continue to be
provided.”11 They made it clear that the “exclusion” provision was to be only
temporary.12 In addition, the PLO opposed for many years the provision that
would grant individual Palestinian refugees the status bestowed by the 1951
Convention because this was considered prejudicial to the inalienable rights of
the Palestinian people as a whole.13
8 Art. 1D of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. See further in S. Akram, “Reinterpreting
Palestinian Refugee Rights under International Law and a Framework for Durable Solutions”, in N. Aruri
(ed.), Palestinian Refugees: The Right of Return, London, Pluto Press, 2001, 167.
9 J. Hathaway in L. Takkenberg, The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1998, 90.
10 S. Akram, “Reinterpreting Palestinian Refugee Rights under International Law and a Framework for Durable
Solutions”, in N. Aruri (ed.), Palestinian Refugees: The Right of Return, London, Pluto Press, 2001, 173.
11 Takkenberg, The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law, op. cit. 66.
12 Ibid, 66.
13 Ibid. 125.
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2.1. Accommodating Palestinians in Egypt
Current estimates of the size of the Palestinian population in Egypt range from
50,000 to 70,000.14 They are dispersed in most of the central and north-eastern
governorates, living in major cities and in some rural towns. They do not live in
camps and there are no special assistance bodies or organizations that serve them.
The Palestinians arrived in Egypt after 1948 in several waves. Some were forced
out by war and Israeli military occupations in 1948, 1956, and 1967. Others
were motivated to go to Egypt for socioeconomic reasons, as well as prospects of
tertiary education and/or employment. Palestinians tended to group in one place
based on their village of origin, their profession, or previously established social
networks in Egypt.
We are originally from Youbna (in the sub-district of Ramleh). When the
1948 War started, Youbna inhabitants, including my own family, fled to
Ashdod. We had to leave all of our belongings, as well as abandoning our
wheat fields. We later arrived in Majdal (now Ashkelon) and then Khan
Younis. As the fighting approached, we moved to another area. We bought
camels and left Khan Younis for Faqous (in Sharqieh governorate), where
my cousins were living. When crossing Sinai, people either walked or trav-
elled on camels to Faqous and lived in tents. We are one big family.15
The first wave of refugees arrived during 1948 from cities, towns, and villages
close to Gaza, such as Youbna, Ramleh, and Majdal. They joined those who had
arrived earlier, as individuals connecting with their social and professional net-
works, from northern Palestinian locations, such as Jaffa, and established busi-
ness networks in Egypt.16 Egypt did not welcome the establishment of camps
after the Nakba17 in 1948, except for two temporary camps for a few thousand
people in northwest Sinai (Azarita and Qantara Sharq). They were dismantled
after a year and their Palestinian residents were either sent to Maghazi camp in
the Gaza strip or were permitted to remain if they could produce a guarantor in
Egypt. A camp established in Abbasieh, Cairo was dismantled in the 1980s and
its inhabitants moved to other urban districts in Cairo, principally Ain Shams
and Madinet El Salam. The overall number of Palestinians in Egypt after the
1948 war did not exceed 13,000 people.
The Higher Committee for Palestinian Immigrants was set up by the
Egyptian State to deal with this modest flow of Palestinians and to take
charge of those in need of economic assistance. Palestinians had to prove their
14 According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) in 2005 there were 62,000 Palestinians in
Egypt [http://www.pcbs.gov.ps (last visited 22 Feb. 2009)]. According to the Palestinian ambassador to
Egypt in 2000 there were 53,000 Palestinians living in Egypt. In the same year, the Egyptian government
reported there were 70,000 Palestinians. The 2002 report of the US Committee for Refugees (USRC) stated
that there were 50,000 Palestinians in Egypt at the end of 2001.
15 Field interview, Faqous/Sharqiyyah Governorate, 14 July 2002.
16 The relationship between Palestinians and Egyptians dates back to the 19th century where people used to
commute between Northern Palestine and Egypt for business and educational purposes.
17 Nakba or the Catastrophe refers to the ethnic exodus of the Palestinians in 1948.
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status as refugees, defined by the Higher Committee as persons who sought
refuge in the country from 1948 to 1950.18 They did this by showing the
residency cards issued by the Egyptian Department of Passports and
Nationality that officially recorded refugee status.
UNRWA, established in December 1949, had an operational mandate in
Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza. Its operation did not, how-
ever, include Egypt. The same was true of international NGOs that also chose
not to work in Egypt, except sporadically. Our research only identified one single
family, in Faqous (Sharqiyyah Governorate), who mentioned receiving modest
assistance from a foreign NGO, the Quakers, which was working in Gaza and
providing limited assistance to those Palestinians in rural areas in Egypt.19 The
fact that both the Royal family of Egypt in 1948 represented by King Farouq and
later the Free officers represented by Mohammed Naguib did not welcome the
creation of camps, excluded Palestinians in Egypt from being part of the inter-
national relief and assistance.
The second flow of Palestinians arrived after Gamal Abdul Nasser came
to power in 1954 and opened Egypt’s borders to Palestinians living in Gaza
(refugees registered with UNRWA and non-refugees) as a result of the dire
economic situation in Gaza. They were offered work in the public sector and
places at Egyptian universities. When the 1967 war broke out, most of this
group was prevented from returning to their homes in Gaza.
The 1967 war brought two additional groups to Egypt. One group
included persons expelled by the Israelis as they occupied Gaza and who were
taken to the Egyptian border or expelled via Jordan.
I came to Egypt from Gaza via Jordan. When leaving Palestine, Al-Yahoud
[the Jews, i.e. the Israeli soldiers] made us sign/fingerprint a blank white
paper to let us pass. I had to sign. All I wanted was to run away with my
children to a safe place.20
The second group included significant numbers of Palestinians who had served
in Gaza, either as members of the Palestine Liberation Army/Ain Jalut Brigade or
as part of the Egyptian irregular forces led by Mustafa Hafez.21 Many of them
18 M. Dajani, The Institutionalisation of Palestinian Identity in Egypt, Cairo Papers in Social Science, Cairo,
American University in Cairo, 1986.
19 The Quakers, in coordination with the Egyptian Government, had set up camps and provided other forms of
relief until mid-1950, when UNRWA took over. J. Peteet, “The AFSC Refugee Archives on Palestine,
1948–1950”, in S. Tamari and E. Zureik (eds.), Reinterpreting the Historical Record: The Uses of
Palestinian Refugee Archives for Social Science Research and Policy Analysis, Jerusalem: Institute for
Jerusalem Studies and Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001.
20 Field interview, Bilbays/Sharqiyyah Governorate, 11 July 2002.
21 Mustafa Hafez, Chief of Egyptian military intelligence in Gaza, formed a commando unit whose nucleus was
a group of Palestinians who had been utilized by the Egyptians to conduct unarmed reconnaissance missions
inside Israel since 1949. Y. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement
1949–1993, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, 63. Following the Feb. 1955 raid, Hafez was authorized
by the Egyptian high command to transform his fedayeen (who were paid out of the Egyptian administration
in Gaza) into a formal military unit called the 141 Battalion. These special forces were commonly known as
the Mustafa Hafiz Brigades.
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were seized by the Israelis and taken to the Egyptian border. Some informants
told us that Israeli soldiers had threatened to kill them if they were not permitted
to enter Egypt. The International Committee of the Red Cross helped many
Palestinians cross the Suez Canal. Egypt, which had ruled Gaza since 1949, took
responsibility for sheltering Palestinians who had been associated with its admin-
istration. It accommodated almost 4,000 people from the Palestinian Liberation
Army in areas such as Mudiriet Al-Tahrir, a rural area in northern Egypt, where
they were expected to work in the agricultural sector. Three military camps were
created to shelter families: Omar Bin Al-Khattab, Othman Bin Affan, and Ain
Jalout. Palestinians working for the Office of the Administrative Governor of
Gaza were given new jobs in Egypt. A number of men from Mustafa Hafez’s
forces and their families were sheltered in Wailey, Ain Shams, and Dar Essalam
in Cairo. In 1969, the total number of Palestinians in Egypt was less than
33,000.22
The Egyptian Government, in assisting the Palestinians, gave privileges to
those associated with the PLO. In several Governorates, the PLO was able to run
clinics which continued to function until the 1990s when their budgets were cut
and they were closed; only a single PLO health facility remained in Egypt,
a Palestinian Red Crescent hospital that caters to PLO officials and retirees
once employed by the Egyptian administration in Gaza. The PLO was also
given considerable responsibility for allocating university scholarships to
Palestinians, a privilege which, according to most of our informants, benefited
PLO associates and their children.
Two unions, the Palestinian Labour Union and the Women’s Union (both
officially affiliated to the PLO), were approved by the Egyptian State to address
the needs of the Palestinians. In principle, the Labour Union continues to be the
administrative body responsible for assisting Palestinians with getting work per-
mits. The Women’s Union, a cultural and social union, is limited to working in
Cairo. The Palestinian Charitable Association, established in 1983 and funded
by the Palestinian Businessmen’s Council, does not limit its services to the PLO
community, unlike other PLO-affiliated organizations. Its activities, which
include subsidizing education and health services and providing job opportu-
nities for Palestinians and advice to employers, thrived in the early 1990s, but its
resources are now limited. It currently serves several hundred Palestinian families
who live below the poverty line. Many of those assisted by the association are
women abandoned by their husbands when the latter left to join the Palestinian
Authority in Gaza in the mid-1990s.
2.2. Political support for Palestinians
Reacting to the dispossession of the Palestinians after the Nakba, most members
of the Arab League pledged to provide assistance and political protection for the
22 L. Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for a State, New York, Columbia
University Press, 1988.
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Palestinians living in their territories. In Article 1 of Resolution 462 of
23 September 1952, the Arab League’s Political Committee advised Arab
Governments to defer efforts to settle Palestinian refugees and called on the
UN to implement resolutions on the return of Palestinian refugees and com-
pensation for damages and property losses. More importantly, Article 2, while
recommending that Arab host countries endeavour to improve the refugees’
living conditions and coordinate with UNRWA to create work, reaffirmed
at the same time, that these projects should not aim at settling Palestinians
permanently and should preserve their right to return and compensation.23
In Article 3, the Committee required Arab Governments to coordinate efforts
to facilitate the travel of Palestinians and to cooperate in accommodating their
temporary stay in host countries. In 1965, the Arab League, reiterating the same
pledges and safeguarding Palestinian identity, adopted the Casablanca Protocol
on the Treatment of Palestinians. Not all Arab host states abided by these agree-
ments, however, and the conditions of access to basic rights by the Palestinians
varied greatly. President Nasser’s commitment to treat Palestinians on a par with
Egyptians – as Arab brethren rather than refugees and offering them access to
all services provided by the state – was not copied by many Arab host states.24
As mentioned above, Egypt has always played a role in the forging of
Palestinian representative structures, from the Government of All Palestine25
to the formation of the PLO/Fatah. Egyptian support for the Palestinians and
the PLO derived from the Nasserite ideology calling for Arabism and
“Palestinianism”.26 In the early 1960s, Nasser emphasized the need for a separate
Palestinian political entity, at a time when the Palestinians mostly got attention
due to acts of military resistance. At the January 1964 Arab Summit in Cairo,
Ahmad Shuqayri, the Palestinian delegate to the Arab League, was asked to
initiate discussions with the aim of establishing a representative political
entity. Nasser encouraged him to bring military elements into the new organi-
zation, which he persuaded the League to approve. The purpose for Nasser’s
sponsorship of the PLO was in large part to counter the growth of and to
strengthen the new organization’s appeal by drawing in Palestinian groups
advocating armed struggle.27 Even before the creation of the PLO, Palestinian
student and workers’ organizations of the diaspora had been founded in Egypt,
opening space that was later broadened with the creation of the PLO in Kuwait.
23 Although Muhammad Naguib, Egypt’s first President (1952–54) was clear about rejecting a role for
UNRWA providing services to Palestinians in Egypt, he did hold talks with UNRWA concerning Gaza,
which under the terms of the 1949 Rhodes Agreement between Israel and Egypt was placed under Egyptian
Administrative and Military rule.
24 Syria continues to ensure Palestinians their basic rights in education, employment in the public sector and
even in military service within the special Palestinian branch. Jordan in 1949 annexed the West Bank of
Palestine and entitled Palestinians in the West Bank and the East Bank to Jordanian nationality.
25 The Government established under the auspices of the Arab League in Gaza on 22 Sept. 1948, during the
1948 Arab–Israeli War, op. cit. fn2.
26 In the words of Maha Dajani, from that time forward “Nasserism and Palestinianism became two sides of the
same coin.” Dajani, 1986, 19.
27 El-Abed 2009, Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, op. cit. 133–4.
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The activist Palestinian Women’s league, which was later instrumental in estab-
lishing the PLO-affiliated Women’s Union, was founded in Cairo.
The relationship deteriorated as the PLO criticized Nasser for his accep-
tance of the second Rogers Plan in August 1970.28 PLO offices and radio sta-
tions in Cairo were closed. Notwithstanding the tense political relations, before
his death in September 1970, Nasser tried to intervene between the PLO and
Jordan’s King Hussein during the bloody conflict (Black September), which
opposed the Hashemite regime to Palestinian fedayeen groups.
Egypt co-sponsored the resolution at the 1974 Rabat Arab summit, which
proclaimed the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people. Relations deteriorated after the 1975 Sinai II disengagement agreement,
however, which basically signalled Egypt’s withdrawal from the Arab–Israeli
conflict. Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 and the subsequent
Arab Summit in Tripoli where the PLO joined Syria, Algeria, and South
Yemen in an anti-Egyptian coalition further aggravated tensions. The General
Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS), the most active PLO body in Egypt, was
closed in 1977 and has since not been allowed to reopen.
The February 1978 assassination of the Egyptian Minister of Culture, in
Nicosia, Cyprus, by the renegade Palestinian Abu Nidal faction froze the rela-
tionship between the PLO and the Egyptian State.29 At al-Siba‘i’s funeral,
Egyptian Prime Minister Mustafa Riyad declared there would be “no more
Palestine after today.”30 The formal break occurred when Egypt and Israel
signed a peace treaty on 17 March 1979. Relations between Egypt and the
PLO were at a standstill.
Relations worsened further after the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear
reactor at Tammuz in 1981. Two days after a meeting between Sadat and Israeli
Prime Minister Menachem Begin in Sharm Al-Sheikh, Israel invaded Lebanon in
June 1982, triggering even more popular support for the Palestinian cause. This
was evident when Palestinian fighters who had been with Arafat (who headed for
Tunisia) during the siege of Beirut, arrived in Egypt. In 1985, it was estimated
there were over 100,000 Palestinians in the country.31 Egypt has endeavoured to
play an active role in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process and in more recent
years, has sought to mediate between Fatah and Hamas.
The relationship between the PLO and the Egyptian Government has
fluctuated but maintained the strong patriarchal flavour established by Nasser.
Among those we interviewed, all talked about the effects on them every time
28 A framework proposed by US Secretary of State William P. Rogers to contain further belligerence following
the 1967 war.
29 Though Abu Nidal had been expelled from Fatah and the PLO, with much fanfare, in the early 1970s and
had become its bitter foe, the Egyptian government and media did not hesitate to stigmatize the Palestinians
in general for the assassination. P. Seale, Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire, New York, Random House, 1992, 164.
30 A.D. Miller, The Arab States and the Palestine Question Between Ideology and Self-Interest, Washington D.C.,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1986, 64.
31 According to Al-Ahram, 16 July 1985, there were over 100,000 Palestinians in the country. Quoted in El-
Abed, Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, op. cit. 29.
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wider political relations fluctuated. They noted that even after immediate polit-
ical crises and relations are resolved, there is often little positive impact on their
status and living conditions.
3. Acquisitions and denial of rights
The welcome given to Palestinians by Nasser in 1954 was formalized by an order
he issued in 1962 to consider Palestinians as an exception to the general rules
regarding foreigners and to permit them access to public sector services on a par
with Egyptians. Law 66 and a subsequent decision in May 1963 to exempt them
from having to obtain work permits from the Ministry of Labour marked the
beginning of what Palestinians in Egypt continue to describe as a “golden era.”32
Palestinians were permitted to reside in Egypt with no constraints. In 1960, the
United Arab Republic Decision No. 28 regarding travel documents for
Palestinians made clear that their possession of these documents would not in
any sense jeopardize Palestinian identity. The decision was accompanied by
instructions from the Interior Ministry to the Department of Immigration,
Passports, and Nationality, emphasizing the need to preserve Palestinian nation-
ality for Palestinian residents of the UAR because they would be returning to
their original homeland after its liberation.33
As mentioned earlier, 1978 marked a political turning point in Palestinian–
Egyptian relations as the status of Palestinians was undermined and rights
and privileges were taken away, never to be restored. Laws were changed and
Palestinians were classified as “foreigners.” Now the only Palestinians who could
attend public schools were children of PLO staff or those whose parents worked
for the civil service. Private school fees were not always affordable especially
when the breadwinner could not ensure a regular income. Accessing a job
became impossible as the public sector was blocked for Palestinians. In the
private sector, a law stipulated that foreigners could not exceed 10 per cent of
the total workforce in any enterprise so as not to compete with the national
labour force.34 University education was no longer free and Palestinians were
now required to pay in pounds sterling.35 Today it is very difficult to determine
the literacy and education levels for Palestinians in Egypt. It is clear, however,
that only a small number attend school or university, which open avenues to
a better and more stable future.
Because of our financial situation, I have never been to school. I wanted to
go to school with friends, have a school bag and wear a uniform . . . just like
32 A.Q. Yassin, “Palestinians in Egypt”, Samed al-Iqtisadi, Ramallah, West Bank, Shaml, 1996, 15.
33 Al-Ahram, 20 Apr. 1960. Quoted in El-Abed, Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, op. cit. 40.
34 Law 25 of 1982, stipulated that foreigners could not exceed 10 per cent of the total workforce in any
enterprise so as not to compete with the national labour force, Official Gazette, quoted in El-Abed,
Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, op. cit. 93.
35 Often the way out for some interviewed students is to seek tertiary education at Al Azhar University which
offers free education in Arabic and sharia (Islamic law).
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my friends. I am so frustrated that it never worked out for me. I tried to
look for work. I found a job cleaning in a dog yard. The dog once bit me
and my mother asked me to quit since it could endanger my health. When
I went with my sister to literacy classes, we could not pay the fees. All I do
is sleep, wake up, wait for my friends to come back from school and then
play in the streets and do some shopping for Mum. I could not find even a
place to learn a skill. Instead, I became a servant bringing coffee and tea and
cleaning.36
Mobility has become restricted. To ensure re-entry to Egypt, Palestinians holding
a valid residency permit, and who are travelling, or residing abroad, must either
return to Egypt every six months or provide the Egyptian authorities, in advance,
with proof of employment or of current enrolment in an educational institution
abroad. In such cases, a one-year return visa may be granted. No extension or
renewal can be granted through Egyptian embassies abroad. Any delay beyond
the stipulated deadline can result in denial of entry or deportation.
Residence permits for Palestinians have become contingent on providing
a reason for remaining in Egypt. The grounds for continued residence are for
education, work with a contract, marriage to an Egyptian, or a business part-
nership with an Egyptian. In all cases, an official document, proving that the
applicant lives in Egypt for one of these approved reasons, must be provided.
Those still employed or who have worked for the Egyptian Government, the
Office of the Governor of Gaza, or the PLO have the least problems renewing
residence permits as a letter from their workplace proving employment or retire-
ment status facilitates renewal. Due to limitations imposed on formal employ-
ment, most Palestinians work in the informal sector, making it difficult to
provide the requested work certificates. Palestinians often present a taxi driver’s
licence to the authorities to be able to renew their residence permits. These are
not difficult to obtain. Alternatively, an agricultural labourer’s licence, which can
be obtained with a letter from the Labour Union, may also be used as proof of
being an unskilled labourer and thus ensure a residency permit.
Residency permits for children are renewed automatically with those of
their parents. Problems arise, however, when young people reach the age of 18
when they risk being deported or imprisoned if they are not still at school or
again at the age of 21, if they have not found licensed work upon completion of
their university education. For many Palestinians, the costs of remaining at
school or university are prohibitive. The Egyptian State mostly turns a blind
eye to the situation of the many Palestinian youth who are in violation of these
regulations.
My son will soon turn 21. His father and I are thinking of getting him
married soon. We have asked for the hand of my niece, an Egyptian, but her
parents refused because my son is Palestinian. We have ensured the situation
36 Field interview, Faisal/Cairo, 15 June 2002.
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of our two daughters who are both engaged to Egyptians. Eventually they
will get Egyptian nationality.37
Amendments to the nationality law passed by the National Assembly in July
200438 gives Egyptian women equal rights as men in passing nationality on to
their children. This is indicative of a step forward, and beneficial to Palestinians
with Egyptian mothers and Palestinian fathers. Article 2 of the law states that an
Egyptian national is a person born either to an Egyptian father or an Egyptian
mother. Any person born after the passage of the law automatically becomes an
Egyptian national. Regarding persons born to an Egyptian father or mother prior
to the new law, Article 3 states that those who wish to obtain Egyptian nation-
ality must apply to the Interior Minister. Citizenship will be granted either by
decision of the minister or after a year the application is returned with a stamp
indicating “no objection”. The law further stipulates a one-year grace period
during which to apply. The decision is hence left to the Minister of Interior in
respect of Palestinians born before 2004.39 Given that an estimated one-third
of all Egyptian women who are married to non-nationals are married to
Palestinians, the passage of such a law promises to be the most significant devel-
opment for Palestinians in Egypt since the Nasser era.40
Egypt has continuously maintained its patriarchal role towards Palestinian
politics and has pledged to safeguard Palestinian identity. However, Egypt has
simultaneously withheld rights from Palestinians and with the new decision
related to the nationality law enabled the new generation of Palestinian-born
children to Egyptian mothers to be naturalized. This decision is not without
contradictory consequences.
3.1. Stigmatized community
I do not emphasize who I am. Some people look at me as a Palestinian,
others as an Egyptian. I try not to say I am Palestinian. I like Egypt and I do
not want to leave because I know it. We all feel like Egyptians.41
37 Field interview, Abu Zaabal/Qalyubiyyah Governorate, 30 June 2002.
38 Law No. 154/2004 Amending Certain Provisions of Law No. 26/1975 Concerning Egyptian Nationality, which
granted Egyptian women the same rights as Egyptian men with regard to conferring nationality on their
children. Thus, Art. 2 of the law states that an Egyptian national is a person born either to an Egyptian father
or an Egyptian mother; in accordance with this law, any person born after the passage of the law auto-
matically becomes an Egyptian national. As for persons born to an Egyptian father or mother before the
activation of the new law, Art. 3 states that those who wish to obtain Egyptian nationality must apply to the
Interior Minister; citizenship will be granted either by decision of the minister or one year after receipt from
the ministry of the application stamped with the words “no objection.” The law further stipulates a one-year
grace period during which to apply. R Leila, “The long-awaited, revised Egyptian Nationality Law has
become a reality”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 1–7 July 2004.
39 Some interviewees confirmed that they applied to the Ministry of Interior in 2004, after the law was issued
but have still to receive a response.
40 L. Reem, “The Long-Awaited, Revised Egyptian Nationality Law Has Become a Reality”, Al-Ahram Weekly,
1–7 July 2004.
41 Field interview, Bilbays/Sharqiyyah Governorate, July 2002.
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Palestinians are scattered widely across different governorates and interact
socially, professionally, and culturally with Egyptians. They bond with them
as Arabs, Muslims, neighbours, and most importantly, as Palestinians in their
steadfastness, coming from the land of Palestine, with its holy places and its
historic permanence. Over time, and due to intermarriage, it has become
difficult to determine who is Palestinian and who is Egyptian on the basis
of appearance and dialect. Several factors have played a role in moulding
Palestinian identity in Egypt. The interviews did not reflect a clear pattern of
identity. Some Palestinians have chosen to assimilate socially and build stron-
ger ties with Egyptians than with Palestinians. Others, who have successfully
integrated socially, revealed a strong sense of Palestinian identity and
belonging.
I do not feel different from Egyptians. My brothers and I have lived here all
our lives. We have definitely been affected by the Egyptian life. To a certain
extent, we differ from our parents in the way we talk, the way we live. We
differ even from the young people in Palestine. I went to live in Gaza
and I felt a great difference. I do not know how, but the men there are
strong and stubborn. They do not talk much and they do not make jokes.
Their lives are very serious and hard, the exact opposite of here. They are
very kind people and it may take me time to adapt but I like living in
Palestine.42
The ways in which Palestinian identity was moulded among first-generation
Palestinians in Egypt – those who have lived in Palestine and witnessed the dis-
possession and the dispersal of the Palestinian community – differ completely
from those generations born and raised in Egypt. The role the first generation
played in the fight and in the formation of a Palestinian national entity may have
strengthened a sense of Palestinian identity. Nostalgia for the homeland, dreams
of liberation, defeats in war, the oppression of Arab political systems, and dis-
appointment with the Arab position made the first generation feel different from
other Arab nationals. In many cases, they told us they felt more distinctly
Palestinian.
For the second and subsequent generations, the situation is quite different.
Born and raised in Egypt, they have been brought up in a community where
Palestinians are not as easily identified as different. Some interviewees reported
that their own family members had asked them not to emphasize the fact
they were Palestinians, telling them to lower their voices when talking about
Palestine or Palestinian relatives. Many reported that their closest ties and
contacts were with Egyptians. Some second and third generation Palestinians
said they did not feel like Palestinians, or different from Egyptians, except
42 Field interview, Shubra Al-Khaima/Qalyubiyyah Governorate, 11 June 2002.
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when visiting administrative offices such as Mogamma (government compound)
or the office of the Governor of Gaza to renew residence permits or travel
documents.
I do not consider myself Palestinian at all. I consider myself Egyptian. Only
the papers make me Palestinian. 43
The fieldwork reflected varying levels of Palestinian identification according
to social, political, and economic factors. No clear pattern was found among
interviewees, since one’s identity is a personal choice. In some cases, Palestinians
have tended to hide their identity and assimilate socially within Egyptian society.
In other cases, Palestinians integrated while more strongly maintaining
Palestinian cultural behaviour and the Palestinian dialect.
Second generation Palestinians in Egypt have had different cultural and
educational exposure to Egypt. School children in Palestinian refugee camps
in the five areas of UNRWA operations are taught about Palestine and their
villages of origin because of the locality (being in the camp) and because of
the teachers who come from the camp community and manage to strengthen
the Palestinian identity informally. Their teachers come from the same back-
ground.44 This is not the case in Egypt. A study of political education of
Egyptian children through school textbooks noted that, in 1981, only 16 per
cent of instruction was aimed at promoting the sense of belonging to the
Arab nation, whereas 54 per cent was devoted to Pharaonic Egypt and 30 per
cent to the Egyptian identity per se, above and beyond the stress placed on
Egyptian citizenship considered independently of the Arab or Islamic
nation”.45
The Egyptian education system does not, understandably, focus on
Palestine. In addition, private schools for Palestinians have not been permit-
ted.46 However, Palestinian identity and cultural folklore heritage are
encouraged through the activities of the Women’s Union and the Abbad
Shams Choral of the Palestinian Red Crescent, where some Palestinian folk-
lore dances are performed. Attendance and participation by Palestinians, how-
ever, usually only includes those affiliated with the Union or those living in
Cairo.
43 Field interview, Dar Essalam/Cairo, 2 June 2002.
44 J. Hart, “UNRWA and children”, in UNRWA, A History within History, Proceedings of the Centre d‘Etudes
de Recherches sur le Moyen-Orient Contemporain (CERMOC) workshop, Amman, Jordan, 1998.
45 K. Yehia, “The Image of the Palestinians in Egypt, 1982–1985”, Journal of Palestine Studies, 16(2), 1987.
46 A school was created in El Arish, funded by the Businessmen’s Association and the PA Ministry of
Education. After completion, however, it was not permitted to serve either Palestinian or Egyptian students
and is now used by local Bedouin to shelter sheep. (Interview with Ali Jowhar, head of the Palestinian
Charitable Association and the Palestinian Businessmen’s Association, 22 Oct. 2001).
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The role of the immediate family in forming identity and in exposing
younger generations to Palestinian culture is of prime importance.
My father is originally from Jaffa, but I don’t know anything about his
family. He has never been to Jaffa. All I know about Jaffa are stories my
father heard from his father. I know no Palestinians here.47
Interviewees suggested that when the male household head was a PLO fighter
or busy working in informal employment, they have had little time to spend
with their families and rarely talk about memories of Palestine and family his-
tory. Traditional authoritarian relations between fathers and children prevent a
participatory exchange of ideas, stories, reminiscences, and questions about the
homeland. Regardless of whether they appreciate or understand Palestinian
traditions, it is natural that Egyptian women married to Palestinians will pass
on Egyptian culture to their children. In most families interviewed, second
generation Palestinians expressed stronger ties with their Egyptian maternal
family than with their Palestinian relations, because they know them better
and see them more often.
It is clear that attachment to the family in Palestine often represents a search
for identity and personal efforts to keep memories of the homeland alive.
Communication with family at home is a way to reflect solidarity and to express
concern. Events in the Occupied Territories are often discussed at family gather-
ings. Concern about the uncertain future of the state to be and about family
members back in Palestine, all tie Palestinians to their homeland and to their
social networks there.
My wife’s family lives back in Gaza. We have been very worried about them
during this [second] intifada. Since we don’t have a telephone line, they sent
us a mobile phone so we can send each other messages to know how things
are doing . . . We are very close to our family in Palestine. My uncles tried to
help me find work in Gaza when they found out that I was unable to find
work here. They are both painters and cement masons. They sent me a visit
permit and I worked with them in construction a few years back.48
Interviewees indicated that marriage to Palestinians is a means to strengthen
ties to Palestine. Intermarriage helps maintain identity, since both the man
and the woman share the same Palestinian values, culture, and rituals. Most
importantly, marrying a Palestinian can be a means of long-term planning for
the future and create a basis for return to Palestine. Out of a strong desire to
47 Field interview, Hehya/Sharqiyyah Governorate, 15 July 2002. This interviewee was a third-generation
Palestinian in Egypt whose grandfather from Jaffa arrived in Hehya with his Egyptian wife in 1948. He
was involved in selling clothes between Jaffa and Egypt.
48 Field interview, Shubra Al-Khaima/Qalyubiyyah Governorate, 11 June 2002. During the period of the
fieldwork when we interviewed them it was clear that Palestinians in Egypt were the ones asking relatives
in Palestine to send them financial assistance. Despite the occupation and the second intifada, Palestinians in
Gaza were able to earn money from employment with the Palestinian Authority or in the informal economy.
The shekel–Egyptian pound exchange rate benefitted those receiving funds in Egypt.
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belong and to rediscover their roots, Palestinians value such marriages as an
occasion to introduce their children to the village network. Palestinian villages
and Egyptian villages share many of the same ceremonial practices. In Egypt,
some Palestinians tend to build a replica of the culture they left behind.
My children’s weddings were held the Palestinian way, with five to seven
days of taalile [festivities for the bridegroom] before the wedding night. We
usually do it in clubs and we bring Palestinian singers and dancers of dabkeh
[traditional Palestinian dance].49
3.2. Fear and mistrust
Even those who feel strongly about their identity often find ways to conceal their
“Palestinianism” for various reasons. The majority of Palestinians in Egypt speak
the Egyptian dialect. This linguistic assimilation is a means of becoming
accepted within the host community and avoiding scrutiny. The fact that in
many cases Palestinians feel compelled to hide their identity in turn affects the
construction of social networks and the sense of community among Palestinians.
It has also distorted feelings of belonging to Palestine. The political fluctuations
since 1978 in a security-oriented state have left its effects on the population,
specifically in the way people tend to be suspicious of one another and limit
social obligations or responsibilities towards the community. Many of those
we interviewed spoke of how trust – both among Palestinians and between
Palestinians and Egyptians – has been eroded by the repercussions of political
events and media stereotyping.
Egypt has been living under emergency law intermittently since 1958 and
continuously since the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. The Emergency
Law 162 of 1958 has given the authorities extensive powers to suspend basic
liberties, including banning demonstrations and public meetings, arresting and
detaining suspects without trial for prolonged periods, and the use of state
security courts whose procedures fall far short of international standards.
Using the Emergency Law, authorities are able to strictly regulate the activities
of groups such as the Palestinians, use surveillance, and powers of mass arrest.
There is thus an intense sense of suspicion. Interviewees said Palestinian “agents”
are used to report to the Egyptian security forces on any actions or expressions of
rejection of the status quo. In such an environment, Palestinians tend to be
cautious when dealing with Egyptians as well as with other Palestinians.
It is better for me not to know [deal with] Palestinians because this can
cause trouble. We are not living in our homeland and every move we make
should be calculated. One should avoid people who may cause suspicion on
the part of the government.50
49 Field interview, Ain Shams/Cairo, 8 June 2002.
50 Field interview, Port Said, 17 May 2002.
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Fears are further ratcheted up by the persistence with which the Egyptian
media stokes up negative public attitudes towards Palestinians. In the public
mind, “Palestinian” conjures up an image of somebody fighting and dying for
the liberation of their occupied lands. This sympathetic perception does not
extend to Palestinians living in Egypt. There is much coverage of events in the
Occupied Territory but at the same time – and particularly at times of regional
political crisis such as after the Gulf War – stories are re-circulated about how
Palestinians are allegedly apathetic, that they greedily sold their land to the Jews
and have thus brought about their own misfortune, or that they are rich and
successful businessmen who need no support.51 This slander influences the
Egyptian public and fuels resentment. Those we interviewed reported that
they have been accused of selling their land to Zionists and of cowardice. To
avoid such harassment, many thus hide their identity.
I know many people here and no one knows I am Palestinian. I do not want
people to be sympathetic just because they know that I am Palestinian. Not
many people can tell whether I am Palestinian or Egyptian. I look and speak
like them. Once in a taxi that I was driving two Egyptian women who
started talking about Palestinians and the second intifada. They argued that
Palestinians deserved what is happening to them since they did this to
themselves by selling their land. I had to speak up because I felt it is not
right that people do not know what happened to us in Palestine.52
Egypt’s internal political circumstances have made Palestinians vulnerable and
led to their depiction as a threat to stability, despite the fact that they constitute
only 0.1 per cent of the population. A state, which has had a strongly patriarchal
role in “preserving their Palestinian identity”, has decided, in an apparent con-
tradiction, not to include Arab regional issues in school curricula and through
its applied politics has prevented Palestinians from affirming their cultural
identity.
4. Conclusion
Rather than protecting the Palestinians and safeguarding their identity, Egyptian
policies have steadily stripped away both their identity and their rights as human
beings and as refugees. The ambiguous legal status of Palestinians in Egypt has
contributed to the precariousness of their situation. Burdensome and increas-
ingly onerous procedures to renew residence permits make their lives tense and
uncertain. The constant instability and uncertainty about residence status affects
51 In 1993, Rose Al-Yusef wrote “Palestinians in Egypt: Refugees and Millionaires”, a newspaper article
discussing how Palestinian businessmen had succeeded in Egypt. For example, “Asfour started as a
worker in a construction factory and then became a millionaire in Egypt.” The article said that there are
2,500 Palestinians who own 15–20 million Egyptian pounds in capital and that they invest their money in
services and transportation. See R. Al-Yusef, “Palestinians in Egypt: Refugees and Millionaires”, 13 Sept.
1993.
52 Field interview, Ain Shams/Cairo, 23 May 2002.
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opportunities for employment and education, which hinge on it. The “travel
documents” given to Palestinians by the Egyptian authorities are a misnomer, for
they do not facilitate travel abroad, but limit Palestinian’s freedom of movement
and make it ever harder to reunify families.
In all the host countries they have found themselves in, Palestinians have
focused on rights (not nationality). Today there are many thousands of young
Palestinians in Egypt who are “illegal”, despite having been born there and never
having known another home. They have no prospect of leaving Egypt unless
they take the risk of leaving for good and they must live with the constant fear of
being discovered. As the third or fourth post-nakba generation, their knowledge
of Palestine and connection to traditional kin networks is minimal. They have
ended up as a group in limbo, denied both rights and an identity. The changes to
the Egyptian national law enacted in 2004 have not resolved the key problem.
The law gives nationality rights to those born after 2004 to Egyptian mothers
but offers nothing to the large number of young Palestinians, born before that
date and educated in Egypt.
At the political level, Egypt maintains its important role in relation to
Palestinian politics and its representation. The close relationship between Gaza
and Egypt serves as a constant reminder of the geographic, historical, and polit-
ical proximity between the two peoples. Inside Egypt, resident Palestinians have
been victimized by policies that do not ensure their basic rights, especially since
Egypt first started normalizing relations with Israel. Palestinians in Egypt are
asking themselves several questions. What negative effects could such a small
minority possibly have on Egypt and its people? How could giving Palestinians
stability in their lives by bestowing rights on them, possibly destabilize Egypt
and affect its political stances and alliances? How, they ask, can a neighbouring
people with such a shared history and culture, be so meanly treated by its
godfather?
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